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It is difficult to find anyone who is satisfied with the way Supreme Court
Justices are appointed today. Many of the criticisms are prompted by partisan-
ship,  of course.  But there is a substantial  element of truth in the complaints
made  by partisans  on both sides.  And  those who  are not partisan, but who
simply want a healthy process that conforms  to the constitutional design and
is likely to produce the best appointments,  have perhaps the most to criticize.
In this Essay, we suggest that a return to the confirmation process contem-
plated by the  text and  structure of the Constitution-a process  in which  the
Senate plays a more independent role than it does today-would help eliminate
aspects  of the  system  that both  sides,  Administration  supporters  as wel  as
Administration critics, find objectionable. It would also produce a better Court
along two dimensions: a Court with Justices of greater distinction, and a Court
that reflects a more appropriate  diversity of views.
Although often overstated, the criticisms of the current process are telling.
Supporters of the Administration object that members of the Senate, and private
groups generally  critical of the Administration,  expend enormous energy  not
in disinterested  inquiry  but in trying to  "catch"  the nominee:  to find some
statement  in her record  that reveals a belief so  extreme  as to  be "out of the
mainstream."  The hearings themselves  consist of trying to get the nominee to
betray views  that will be unacceptable  to the public  at large, or, failing that,
to make inconsistent statements that can be used as evidence of an unprincipled
"confirmation  conversion." As a result, the Administration's supporters insist,
many potential candidates with distinguished records are effectively disqualified
from the Court because their opponents can unfairly attack them with isolated
statements they have  made in the past. The result  is an unduly political  and
sensationalistic spectacle that degrades the Court, the Senate, and the nominee.
t  Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School Strauss served as Special Counsel to the United
States  Senate Committee  on the Judiciary in  connection  with the  nomination of Justice David H. Souter
to the Supreme Court. The views expressed  in this Essay are, of course, those of the  authors alone.
tt  Karl N. Llewellyn Professor of Jurisprudence, University of Chicago, Law School and Department
of  Political Science.  We  are  grateful  to  Akhl  Amar, Elena Kagan,  Jeffrey  Peck, Richard Posner,  and
Geoffrey  Stone for helpful comments on an earlier draft. Bart Aronson,  Sonia Bychkov, Daniel Frank, and
Thomas Marton provided valuable research assistance.
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The Administration's  opponents reply that the real problem is that, for the
Administration,  filling vacancies  on the Supreme  Court has become  a public
relations offensive:  one that consists of managing images and hiding the ball,
while  at the same time pushing  the Court in a consistent and  (to them) un-
healthy direction. The President, his opponents say, chooses "stealth" nominees
whom he has reason to believe are deeply conservative,  but whose views the
Senate  will not be able to uncover. The White House then carefully prepares
the nominees  for the confirmation hearings,  to  the point where  there is now
practically a script: the nominee is open-minded, has "no agenda," enthusiasti-
cally accepts  both Brown v. Board of Education 1  and Griswold v. Connecti-
cut,2 is  humbled  by  the  difficulty  of being  a Justice,  and  admires  Justice
Harlan.3
The nominees commit themselves to liberal-sounding principles of privacy
and racial and gender justice; but the commitments are at such a high level of
platitudinous  abstraction that they reveal  nothing about the nominees'  views
on controversial issues.4 And if anything potentially embarrassing surfaces from
the nominees'  records, the Administration's  opponents  say, the nominees  try
to  distance  themselves  from it or to shift attention  to  other, more  attractive
aspects  of their backgrounds. The consequence is a confirmation  process that
amounts to a media event unedifying for the public, undignified for the country,
and unlikely  to produce outstanding Justices  or an outstanding Court.
Both of these accounts are exaggerated, but neither, unhappily, is very far
from the mark. Indeed, the criticisms,  though  coming from sharply  different
sources,  tend  to converge.  From the  standpoint of the original constitutional
plan, the current practice is indeed inadequate.  Under the constitutional  plan,
the confirmation  process should involve informed and tempered  deliberation
within the Senate, the White House, and the public at large about the best way
to achieve a distinguished Supreme Court. At the very least, the President and
the Senate should  attempt to obtain Justices of outstanding character, of high
intellectual caliber, and with qualities that will contribute something new or of
particular value  to the existing Court. Many  members  of the Senate  and the
Administration have tried hard to carry out this task. But it is-to understate
1.  347 U.S. 483  (1954)  (invalidating segregation of public schools).
2.  381  U.S. 479  (1965)  (striking down ban on use of contraceptives).
3.  The near-compulsory  admiration of Justice Harlan is an especially interesting development. It may
be based not only on Justice Harlan's evident thoughtfulness  and open-mindedness, but also on the fact that
he was simultaneously  (1) the most conservative Justice on the late Warren Court and (2) the preeminent
intellectual  source of the modem approach to substantive due process,  an approach which culminated in
both Griswold and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.  113 (1973). For a critique,  see Bruce Ackerman, The Common
Law Constitution of  John Marshall  Harlan,  36 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 5 (1991).
4.  A related and insufficiently noticed problem is that during the preparation for the hearings, nominees
often consult closely for an extended time with officials in the Department of Justice-the  most frequent
litigant to appear before the nominee if she is confirmed. See "What's the Alternative?":  A Roundtable  on
the Confirmation Process,  ABA J., Jan.  1992, at 41 (remarks  of Michael McConnell); see also infra note
107 and accompanying  text.
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the matter-improbable  that existing procedures  are well suited to its  fulfill-
ment.
The unfortunate  current situation  has many causes, but one that is  most
immediately  apparent  is  the  prolonged  division  of the federal  government
between the two political parties. Nominees  selected by Republican Presidents
have filled the last eleven vacancies on the Supreme Court (and sixteen of the
last twenty). But eight of the eleven appointments were made while the Senate
was solidly controlled by Democratic majorities. Nothing remotely similar has
happened before in our history.5 Despite this unprecedented situation, Republi-
can Presidents have made ideological appointments with little senatorial opposi-
tion, even though the Senate was usually controlled by another party. Any effort
to evaluate the current situation  must come to terms with this striking fact.
One possible response to divided government, and to the troubled Supreme
Court  confirmation  process  it has  produced,  is  for the  Senate  to  be  more
deferential to the Administration's preferences. The Senate might confine itself
to a role similar to that traditionally played by the American Bar Association
and other advisory groups: to inquire into whether the nominee meets certain
standards  of character and professional  distinction.  Under this approach,  the
Senate  could not appropriately  consider a nominee's  basic  commitments  or
views on controversial  issues, unless  those views were so extreme  as  to call
into question the nominee's  character  or competence.
Confining the Senate to this deferential role would certainly eliminate some
of the  current complaints  about the  antagonistic  nature  of the  confirmation
process, and to this extent it would be an advance. But there is not much else
to commend it. From the constitutional standpoint, this recommendation seems
perverse. The Constitution requires that the Senate give its "Advice and Con-
sent"  to  nominations;6 this  language  contemplates  a more  active  role  than
simple acquiescence whenever a nominee is not deeply objectionable.  Beyond
that nothing in the structure of the Constitution or the nature of Supreme Court
appointments suggests that the Senate should be so deferential. The Senate, no
less than the President, is elected by the people. Supreme Court Justices, unlike
executive branch appointees,  are not the President's  subordinates.  Often the
Court must mediate conflicts between the President and the Congress; one party
to a conflict should not have the dominant role in choosing the mediator.
In our view there are other ways, more consistent with the constitutional
plan, to deal with the defects of the current confirmation process. The first step
is essentially the opposite of the proposal for Senate deference. We suggest that
the Senate should assert its constitutional prerogatives more forcefully, unabash-
edly claiming an independent role. Specifically, the Senate should insist that
it has both the authority to "advise" the President and the power to withold its
5.  See infra Appendix.
6.  U.S.  CONST.  art. II, § 2, cl  2.
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"consent" because it disagrees with the nominee's basic commitments  on the
kinds of issues that are likely to come before the Court.
When Congress considers  the President's  legislative initiatives,  it is  not
deferential.  No  one would  suggest that  Congress should  pass  every  bill  the
President proposes  unless  the  bill fails  some  minimal  test, analogous  to  a
minimal test of character and competence. Congress is free to reject proposed
legislation for political reasons.  This is a most familiar part of the system of
checks and balances. There is no reason for nominations to the Supreme Court
to command greater  deference.
At first glance  it might seem  that our proposal  can  only  make  matters
worse. The problem, one might say, is that the confirmation process is already
too partisan,  too focused on ideology, too  much a media spectacle,  and  too
unmindful of the qualities of genuine distinction that Supreme  Court Justices
should have. We do not disagree with the premise. The current process is too
ideological  and  partisan.  But  paradoxically,  the  best  first  step  toward  a
cure-the best way to obtain distinguished Justices under current conditions-is
for the Senate to assert, rather than abdicate, its role as an equal partner in the
appointment process.  Partisanship  in Supreme  Court nominations  is  indeed
problematic. But one-sided partisanship-in which only the President, and not
the  Senate, is allowed to be partisan-is much worse.
The approach we recommend permits us to suggest several palliatives  for
the problems posed by partisanship in the confirmation process.  In particular,
we argue for a reduced emphasis  on the role of the confirmation  hearings and
greater use of the Senate's "advice" function and of the pre-nomination record.
The current emphasis on the hearings has produced  many of the current diffi-
culties.  An independent role, combined  with revisions  in the process,  would
yield significant  improvements.
In Part I of this Essay, we show how the text, history, and structure of the
Constitution  contemplate  an independent  role for the  Senate.  In Part  II, we
suggest that an independent role is especially appropriate in current conditions.
In Part III, we consider several counterarguments, including the most important:
that our approach  would unduly politicize  the process  of choosing Supreme
Court Justices.  In this final part, we also set out some recommendations  for
improving the confirmation process.
I.  THE  CONSTITUTION
The Constitution fully contemplates  an independent role for the Senate in
the selection  of Supreme  Court Justices.7 Article II,  Section 2  provides  that
7.  An especially helpful  account is James E. Gauch, Comment,  The Intended Role of the Senate in
Supreme Court  Appointments, 56 U. CHL L. REV.  337  (1989);  see also Charles  L. Black, Jr.,  A Note on
Senatorial  Consideration  of Supreme Court  Nominees, 79 YALE L.J. 657 (1970) (arguing that constitutional
considerations  demand enhanced senatorial scrutiny when giving advice and consent to judicial, as opposed
1494 [Vol.  101:  1491
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the President "shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appoint... Judges of the supreme Court."'  These words assign
two distinct roles to the Senate-an advisory role before  the nomination has
occurred and a reviewing function  after the fact. The consent requirement,  if
the Senate takes it seriously, places  pressure on the President to give weight
to senatorial  advice  as well.  At the same time, the advisory  function makes
consent more likely. The clause thus envisions a genuinely consultative relation-
ship between the Senate and the President. It assumes a deliberative process,
jointly conducted, concerning  the composition  of the Court.'
History  supports  this  view of the text. The  most explicit  and  elaborate
contemporaneous  exposition  was  given  by  George  Mason in  1792.  Mason
wrote:
I am decidedly of opinion, that the Words of the Constitution...
give the Senate the Power of interfering in every part of the Subject,
except the Right of nominating....  The Word  'Advice'  here clearly
relates in the Judgment of the Senate on the Expediency or Inexpedi-
ency of the Measure, or Appointment;  and the Word 'Consent' to their
Approbation or Disapprobation of the Person nominated; otherwise the
word Advice has no Meaning at all-and it is a well known Rule  of
Construction, that no Clause or Expression shall be deemed superflu-
ous, or nugatory, which is capable of a fair and rational Meaning. The
Nomination,  of Course, brings the Subject fully under the Consider-
ation of the Senate; who have then a Right to decide upon its Propriety
or Impropriety. The peculiar  Character or Predicament of the Senate
in the Constitution of the General Government, is a strong Confirma-
tion of this  Construction.10
As the records of the Constitutional Convention demonstrate, the Constitu-
tion's  drafters  widely  shared  Mason's  view. The Convention had  four basic
options of where to vest the appointment power: it could have placed the power
(1) in the  President  alone, (2)  in  Congress  alone,  (3)  in the  President  with
congressional  advice and consent, or (4) in Congress with Presidential  advice
and consent. Some version of each of these options received serious consider-
ation.
to executive branch, nominees); Luis Kutner, Advice and Dissent:  Due Process  of the Senate, 23 DEPAUL
L.  REV.  658  (1974)  (arguing  that Constitution calls for  consultation  before appointments);  Charles  M.
Mathias,  Jr., Advice and Consent: The Role of the United States Senate in the Judicial  Selection Process,
54 U. CH.  L. REV. 200 (1987)  (arguing that Senate needs to reconceptualize its role of advice and consent
and needs to devote  more resources  to enhancing role).
8.  U.S.  CoNST. art  II, § 2, cl.  2.
9.  In this  way  the  system  strikes  some  recurrent  constitutional  chords.  See  Joseph  M.  Bessette,
Deliberative  Democracy: The Majority Principle  in Republican Government, in How DE  OCRAnTC IS THE
CONSTITUTION?  102 (Robert A. Goldwin  & William A. Schambra eds.,  1980) (arguing that constitutional
system of checks  and balances  was intended to promote deliberative  government).
10.  Letter from George Mason to James Monroe  (Jan. 30, 1792), reprinted  in 3 PAPERS  OF  GEORGE
MASON  1255  (William T. Hutchinson & William M.E. Rachal  eds., 1970).
1495 1992]
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The  ultimate  decision  to  vest the  appointment  power  in  the  President
stemmed from a belief that he was uniquely capable of providing the requisite
"responsibility."  A single person would be distinctly accountable  for his acts.
At the same time, however, the Framers greatly feared a Presidential monopoly
of the process.  They worried  that  such a monopoly  might lead  to  a lack  of
qualified  and  "diffused"  appointees,  and  to  patronage  and  corruption.  The
Framers also feared insufficient attentiveness to the interests of different groups
affected by the Court.
An important feature of the debates was the Framers'  effort to design the
appointments  process  in a way  that would  protect the interests  of the  small
states.  In  thinking  about  the  appointment  of Supreme  Court  Justices,  the
Framers thus focused on the likelihood that nominees would be attentive to the
various interests affected by the Court Conflicts between large and small states,
a principal  political  question  of the  founding period,  present  a  much less
important  issue today. But there  are now  other conflicting interests  that are
profoundly  affected by the composition  of the Supreme  Court. The Framers
contemplated a senatorial role precisely to protect such interests, and to assure
a degree of political oversight of the likely votes of Supreme  Court nominees.
The central importance of this political concern to the selection process, as that
process was originally designed, strongly argues against a Presidential monopo-
ly today.
The  compromise  that  finally  emerged-the  system  of advice  and  con-
sent-was  designed  to counteract  all of these various  fears. Throughout  the
Convention, representatives  of the smaller states  were especially skeptical  of
a large Presidential role and insistent on the need for the safeguards that the
Senate  could provide.  Representatives  of the  larger  states,  concerned  with
congressional  partiality  and  lack  of responsibility,  sought  to  constrain  the
Senate."  The  requirement  of senatorial  advice  and  consent  simultaneously
responded to both sets of concerns.
A.  The Early Agreement on Congressional  Appointment
It is important to understand  that during almost all of the Convention, the
Framers  agreed  that  the  Senate  alone  or the  legislature  as  a whole  would
appoint the judges. The current institutional arrangement emerged in the last
days of the process. On June 5,  1787, the standing provision required "that the
national Judiciary  be  [chosen]  by the National  Legislature."12 James  Wilson
spoke  against  this  provision and  in favor of Presidential  appointment.13  He
claimed that "intrigue, partiality, and concealment" would result from legislative
11.  See Gauch, supra note 7, at 348.
12.  1 THE RECORDS  OF THE FEDERAL  CONVENTION  OF  1787,  at 119  (Max Farrand ed.,  1966).
13.  Id. at 126.
1496 [Vol.  101:  1491
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appointment,  and  that  the  President  was  uniquely  "responsible.' '14  John
Rutledge responded  that he  "was  by no means  disposed  to  grant so  great  a
power to  any single person. The people will think we are leaning too much
towards  Monarchy.'
1 5
James Madison agreed with Wilson's  concerns about legislative "intrigue
and partiality," but he "was  not satisfied with referring the appointment to the
Executive.' 16 Instead,  he proposed to place the power of appointment in the
Senate,  "as  numerous  eno'  to  be confided in-as  not so  numerous  as to  be
governed  by the motives of the other branch;  and as being sufficiently stable
and  independent to  follow their deliberative  judgments."17 Thus,  on June 5,
by a vote of nine to two, the Convention accepted the vesting of the appoint-
ment power in the Senate.'8
On  June  13,  Charles  Cotesworth  Pinckney  and Roger Sherman  tried to
restore  the  original provision for appointment  of the  Supreme Court  by the
entire  Congress. 9 Madison renewed  his argument  and the motion was with-
drawn.
The issue reemerged on July 18. Nathaniel Ghorum claimed that even the
Senate was "too numerous,  and  too little personally  responsible,  to ensure a
good  choice."2'  He  suggested,  for  the  first time,  that the  President  should
appoint the Justices, with the advice and consent of the Senate-following the
model  set by Massachusetts.2'  Wilson responded that the President should be
able to make  appointments on his own, but that the Ghorunm  proposals were
an acceptable second best.23 Alexander Martin and Sherman endorsed appoint-
ments by the Senate, arguing that the Senate would have greater information
and-a point of special relevance here-that "the Judges ought to be diffused,"
something that "would be more likely to be attended to by the 2d. branch, than
by the Executive."24 Edmund Randolph echoed this view. s
In the end, the Ghorum proposal was rejected by a vote of six to two. At
that point,  Ghorum  suggested,  as  an  alternative,  that  the  President  should
nominate and appoint judges with the advice and consent of the Senate. On this
the vote was evenly  divided, four to four.'
14.  Id. at 119.
15.  Id.
16.  Id. at 120.
17.  Id. (footnote omitted).
18.  Id.
19.  Id. at 224, 232 n.12.
20.  Id. at 232-33.
21.  2 id. at 41.
22.  Id.
23.  Id.
24.  Id.
25.  Id. at 43.
26.  Id. at 44.
1992] 1497
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Madison then proposed  Presidential nomination with  an opportunity  for
Senate  rejection,  by a two-thirds  vote,  within  a specified  number of days.27
Changing his earlier position, Madison urged that the executive would be more
likely "to  select fit characters,"  and that "in case of any flagrant partiality  or
error, in the nomination, it might be fairly presumed that 2/3 of the 2d. branch
would join in putting a negative on it."  Pinckney spoke against this propos-
al,29 as did George Mason, who argued: "[A]ppointment  by the Executive [is]
a dangerous prerogative. It might even give him an influence over the Judiciary
department itself." 30
The motion was  defeated  by six  to three.  By the same vote,  the earlier
Madison proposal, in which the Senate would appoint the Justices, was accept-
ed.31
The  issue  next  arose  on  August  23. Robert  Morris  argued  against  the
appointment of officers by the Senate, considering "the body as too numerous
for the purpose;  as  subject  to cabal;  and  as  devoid  of responsibility."32 But
it was not until September 4 that the provision appeared in its current form.33
Morris made the only recorded pronouncements on the new arrangement  and
seemed to  speak for the entire, now unanimous  assembly.  Morris said,  "[A]s
the President was to nominate, there would be responsibility, and as the Senate
was  to  concur, there would  be  security." ''  Great weight  should  be given to
the remarks made by Morris because of their timing. The Convention accepted
the provision with this understanding.
B.  The Meaning of the Shift  to Presidential  Appointment With Advice and
Consent by  the Senate
This picture leaves something of a puzzle. For almost all of the Convention,
the appointment power was  vested in the Senate. At the last moment, it was
shifted  to  the  President,  with  the  advice  and  consent  of the  Senate.  What
accounts  for the shift?
We speculate that two developments played an important role. First, on July
16,  1787,  the Convention  approved  the  Great  Compromise,  allowing  equal
representation  for the  states  within  the  Senate  despite  their  differences  in
population. This  additional  security for the small  states  may  have provided
those states with a degree of reassurance that made a Presidential initiative in
the appointments process significantly less threatening. That reassurance, going
27.  Id.
28.  Id. at 80.
29.  Id. at 81.
30.  Id. at 83.
31.  Id.
32.  Id. at 389.
33.  Id. at 495.
34.  Id. at 539.
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to the structure of the document, may have made it less necessary  to insist on
limiting the President's role in appointments.
5
Second, the assessment of Presidential powers appears to have changed in
a major way when the Founders devised the Electoral College, thereby allowing
a degree  of representation  of states  qua states  in the selection of the  Presi-
dent.36 As we have seen, much of the resistance to Presidential power  came
from the small states, which feared that the President would be inattentive to
their interests. Once it was decided that the President would be selected through
the new, protective route, the small states had a new degree of security against
the  obvious  risks,  from  their point of view,  of pure  majoritarianism.  They
therefore would have found it less threatening to vest the power of appointment
in the President in the first instance. The Framers could accomplish the central
goal of ensuring "responsibility" without undue risk to state interests.
But there is no evidence of a general agreement that the President should
have plenary power over the appointments  process.  On the contrary, the ulti-
mate  design  mandated a role  for the  Senate in  the form  of the advice  and
consent  function.  In  this  way, it  carried  forward  the major  themes  of the
debates.  With  respect  to  the  need  for  a Presidential  role,  the  new  system
ensured  "responsibility"37  and  guarded  against  the risk  of partiality  in the
Senate.  With  respect  to  resistance  to  absolute  Presidential prerogative,  the
principal  concerns  included (1) a fear of "monarchy"'  in the form of exclu-
sive  Presidential  appointment;  (2)  a concern  for  "deliberative  judgments"; 9
(3)  a belief that "the Judges  ought to be diffused,"4 0 that is, diverse in terms
of their basic commitments  and alliances;  (4) a fear of executive  "influence
over the  Judiciary  department  itself';4'  and  (5)  a desire  for the  "security"42
that a senatorial role would provide.
As Mason's comments  suggest, the Senate's role was to be a major one,
allowing the Senate to be as intrusive as it chose. Even Hamilton, perhaps the
strongest defender of Presidential power, emphasized that the President "was
bound to submit the propriety of his choice to the discussion and determination
of a different and  independent body."  Of course, the President retained  the
power  to  continue  to  offer  nominees  of his  selection,  even  after  an  initial
rejection. He could continue to name people at his discretion. Crucially, howev-
35.  The argument is advanced  in Gauch, supra note 7, at 347-50.
36.  See CALVIN C.  JILLSON,  CONSTITUTION MAKNG: CONFLICr  AND  CONSENSUS  IN THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 171 (1988); CHARLES C. THACH, THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY,  1775-1789:
A STUDY  IN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY  97-104 (2d ed.  1969).
37.  See supra note 34 and accompanying  text.
38.  See supra note  15 and accompanying  text.
39.  See supra note  17 and accompanying  text.
40.  See supra note 24 and accompanying  text.
41.  See supra note 30 and accompanying  text.
42.  See supra note 34 and accompanying  text.
43.  THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 457 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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er, the Senate was granted the authority to continue to refuse to confirm. It also
received  the authority to "advise."
These simultaneous  powers would bring about a healthy form of checks
and balances, permitting each branch to counter the other. That system was part
and  parcel  of general  deliberation  about  Supreme  Court membership.  The
Convention  debates  afford no basis  for the  view that the  Senate's role  was
designed to be meager. On the contrary, they suggest a fully shared authority
over  the composition  of the Court. That shared  authority  was  to include  all
matters that the Senate deemed relevant, including the nominee's point of view.
As we have noted, this argument derives particular force from the centrality
of the question of states'  interests to the debate over the appointments process.
The split between  the large and  small states  was  among the most important
political  issues  of the  period.  Some  delegates  were  fearful  that  all judicial
nominees would come from large states. More generally, state rivalry, dominat-
ing the debates over the appointments clause, was the functional  equivalent of
the most sharply disputed of current legal and political debates.  There  can be
no question that the  "advice  and  consent"  role was  intended  to provide,  in
Morris'  terms,  "security."  And there can be no question that a central  aspect
of "security"  was the power to refuse to confirm nominees  insensitive to the
interests of a majority of the states. In this sense, political commitments were
understood  to be a properly central ingredient in senatorial deliberations.'
4
C.  The Early Practice
The practice of the Senate in the early days of the republic and thereafter
attests  to  the  same  conclusion.4 5  George  Washington's  nomination  of John
Rutledge, then Chief Justice of South Carolina,  as Chief Justice of the United
States  is the most revealing case  in point.46 Rutledge's  challenge  to  the Jay
Treaty,47 negotiated  by Washington with Great Britain, played a pivotal  role
in the confirmation process. The Jay Treaty was challenged by the Republicans
as a concession to Britain but approved by the Federalists as a way of keeping
the peace.  Rutledge attacked the treaty in a prominent  speech in Charleston.
The Federalists sought to block the Rutledge appointment on straightforwardly
political grounds.  Hamilton, a leader of the support for the Jay Treaty, led the
opposition to Rutledge. The Senate ultimately rejected  Rutledge for political
reasons,  by a vote of fourteen to ten.4
44.  See Gauch, supra note 7, at 363.
45.  See HENRY I  ABRAHAM,  JUSTICES  AND  PRESIDENTS:  A POLITICAL HISTORY  OF APPOINTMENTS
TO THE SUPREME  COURT 71-94 (3d ed.  1992).
46.  See LAURENCE TRIBE,  GOD  SAVE THIS  HONORABLE  COURT 79-80 (1984);  Gauch,  supra note 7,
at 358-62.
47.  Agreement with Great Britain, Nov. 19,  1794, 8  Stat. 116, T.S. No. 105.
48.  There was talk as well of Rutledge's "insanity," but this seemed pretextual. See Gauch, supra note
7, at 360-62.
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Nor  was  the  Rutledge  rejection  unique.  In  1811,  the  Senate  rejected
Madison's appointment of Alexander Wolcott, partly on the basis of political
considerations. In 1826, President Adams'  appointment of Robert Trimble was
nearly rejected on political grounds. The 1828 nomination of John Crittenden,
a Whig,  was  ultimately  prevented  through  postponement,  and  squarely  on
ideological grounds. Similar episodes occurred in the first half of the nineteenth
century. In fact, during the nineteenth century, the Senate blocked one of every
four nominees  for the Court, frequently  on political  grounds.49
The Senate has at times insisted on the "advice"  segment of its constitu-
tional  mandate.  In  1869,  President  Grant  nominated  Edwin  Stanton  after
receiving  a petition to that effect signed by a majority  of the Senate and the
House.50  In  1932, the  Chair of the Judiciary  Committee, George  W. Norris,
insisted  on the  appointment  of a  liberal  Justice  to  replace  Oliver  Wendell
Holmes.51  Greatly  influenced  by  a  meeting  with  Senator  William  Borah,
President  Hoover eventually  appointed  Benjamin  Cardozo  to the  Court.  The
Senator persuaded President Hoover to move Cardozo,  then at the bottom  of
the President's list of preferred nominees,  to the top.52
D.  The Constitutional  Structure
We  have  established  that the  constitutional  text  and  history  support  an
independent role for the Senate in the confirmation  process.  In the particular
context of judicial appointments,  there is an additional and highly compelling
concern,  one that stems from constitutional  structure. It may  be granted that
the Senate ought generally to be deferential to Presidential nominations involv-
ing the operation of the executive branch. For the most part, executive  branch
nominees  must work  closely  with  or under  the  President.  The  President  is
entitled to insist that those nominees are people with whom he is comfortable,
both personally and in terms  of basic commitments  and values.53
49.  See ABRAHAM,  supra  note 45, at 39-42; JOSEPH P. HARRIS,  THE ADVICE AND  CONSENT  OF THE
SENATE:  A  STUDY  OF THE  CONFIMATON  OF  APPOINTMENTS  BY  THE UNITED  STATES  SENATE  302-03
(1953).
50.  See ABRAHAM,  supra note 45, at 127.
51.  See id. at 204.
52.  See id. at 205-06.
53.  This seems  to follow  from  Myers  v. United  States,  272 U.S.  52,  135  (1926)  (suggesting  that
President has power to supervise executive officers even when they are exercising discretion in their ordinary
duties prescribed by statute, and power to remove them for unwise use of such discretion). The constitutional
text,  mandating  Senate involvement  in the  appointment process,  is  identical for  the Senate's review  of
Supreme Court and executive branch nominees. There is thus an argument from the text that an independent
senatorial role is appropriate in all cases. Considerations of history and structure, however, suggest that the
cases  might  be  treated differently.  The complex  history summarized  above,  see supra notes  7-44  and
accompanying text, argues strongly for an independent role for the judicial branch nominees, and it applies
only to these nominees. There is no corresponding debate for executive  branch nominees. As discussed in
the  text,  the  structural  considerations  argue against  an  independent role for the  Senate with respect  to
executive  branch employees,  and for such a role with respect  to Supreme  Court nominees.  See infra Part
ILE. (discussing separation of powers reasons  for independent investigation  of judicial nominees).
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The  case is  quite  different,  however,  when  the President  is  appointing
members of a third branch. The judiciary is supposed to be independent of the
President, not allied with him. It hardly needs emphasis that the judiciary is not
intended  to work under the President.  This point is of special  importance in
light of the fact that many of the Court's decisions resolve confficts between
Congress  and the President.  A  Presidential monopoly on the appointment of
Supreme  Court Justices  thus  threatens  to unsettle  the  constitutional  plan  of
checks  and balances.
Constitutional text,  history, and structure strongly suggest that the Senate
is entitled to assume  a far more substantial role than it has in the recent past.
There are analogies  to proposed legislation and treaties, and to the Presidential
veto. No  one  thinks  that the  Senate must  accept whatever  bill or treaty  the
President suggests simply because it is a "competent" proposal; it would be odd
indeed to claim that the President must sign every bill before looking closely
at the merits. Under the Constitution, the role of the Senate in the confirmation
process should be approached  similarly.
II.  THE SENATE'S ROLE IN  AN  ERA OF DIVIDED  GOVERNMENT
For much of the twentieth  century, the Senate has not made independent
judgments of the kind we urge for Supreme Court nominees. Until 1968, only
one nominee had been rejected by the Senate in this century.5  There is some
controversy  over  exactly  how independent  a role  the  Senate  played  in  the
nineteenth century.
5 5
But  since  1969,  circumstances  have  changed.  Current  condi-
tions-conditions that are unique in our history-justify a more active role for
the  Senate.56  These  circumstances  include  a  large  number  of  consecutive
appointments by Presidents of one party during a period of divided government;
the danger of intellectual homogeneity  on the current Court; overt ideological
attacks  by  the  President  on  the  Court  and  the  self-conscious  screening  of
54.  See ELDER Wrrr,  GUIDE TO THE U.S.  SUPRE1M  COURT 995-98  (1990).
55.  See TRIBE, supra note 46, at 58-59.
56.  In  the  last 23  years,  two nominees  have been withdrawn  to  avoid  Senate  defeats  (Fortas  and
Ginsburg) and three have been defeated (Haynsworth, Carswell,  and Bork). Thus, the Senate has stopped
Presidential  nominees  in  5  of  16  attempts,  which  amounts  to  31%,  a high percentage.  However,  no
understanding has emerged on the part of the Senate that it is entitled to undertake an independent inspection
of the nominee's likely voting record. Indeed, it appears that many Senators believe that such a role would
be unacceptable. See, e.g., 137 CONG REC. S9295 (daily ed. July 9, 1991) (statement of Sen. Grassley);  136
CONG. REC. S14,360 (daily ed. Oct. 2,1990) (statement of Sen. McConnell);  136 CONG. REc. S12,872 (daily
ed. Sept. 12, 1990) (statement of Sen. Hatch); 133  CONG. REC. S14,913 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1987) (statement
of Sen.  Domenici);  133  CONG. REc. S10,537  (daily ed. July 23,  1987)  (statement of Sen. Dole).
All in all, there is no clear current understanding on the part of the Senate of its appropriate role in
the  confirmation process. No sharply defined view has  materialized  on this question.  There is, however,
a discernible shift in the direction suggested in this Essay. See, in particular, the proposed Senate Resolution
introduced by Senator Simon, calling for "philosophical  balance" as a relevant consideration  in selecting
nominees  and requesting  "informal,  bipartisan  consultation  with some  members  of the  Senate"  before
nomination.  S. Res.  194,  102d Cong.,  1st Sess.,  137  CONG. REc.  S14,712 (daily ed. Oct.  15,  1991).
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nominees to the Court by the executive branch;  the effective exclusion of the
Senate  from  the  selection  of lower federal  court judges;  and  the  increased
importance of separation of  powers questions. Under these conditions, deference
by the Senate is likely to produce neither a Court of high quality nor a Court
with the appropriate range of views5
A.  Eleven Consecutive  Appointments During a Period  of  Divided  Government
The most important circumstance is, of course, prolonged divided govern-
ment-specifically, the eleven consecutive Republican appointments, all made
while the Democrats controlled the House, nine while the Democrats controlled
the Senate.5
American politics has not, in general, been characterized by the alternation
of parties in power. 59 Republicans dominated the national government between
the  Civil War and  the New  Deal.6° Democrats  then dominated  until  1968,61
and Republicans  have won five of the last six Presidential elections.
Even so, it is nearly unprecedented  for one party to fill eleven consecutive
vacancies.6 2 This is partly the result of the fact that President Carter was  the
57.  The Senate is  always entitled to take an independent role and to consider likely voting patterns.
It is free to do so even in a period in which the same party controls the Senate and the Presidency. But the
argument  that such  a role would be a structural  imperative  of the  constitutional plan-as  opposed to
constitutionally authorized-would  be far weaker in that event, for reasons  set out below. See infra Parts
Ml.A,  Ml.E. The argument for an independent role would be further weakened if the Court were not, in the
relevant sense, monolithic. A Court with a balance of respectable views, see infra  Part ILF, poses a far less
urgent case for careful inspection by the Senate of likely voting patterns. For these reasons, we believe that
the  case  for  an  independent role  is  currently  far stronger than it was,  for example,  at the time  of the
nomination of Judge Robert Bork.
Things would be different if one party controlled both the Senate  and the Presidency. For example,
there would be little need for a Democratic Senate to undertake an independent investigation of the nominee
of a Democratic President-not because  the Democratic view is "correct,"  but because  there  would be a
reduced need for the Senate to serve as an ideological  check on the President. (Of course, competence  and
character would remain relevant.) Almost none of the arguments would be relevant if a Democratic President
in  (say)  1994 offered  nominations  to a Democratic  Senate.  Yet another  question  would be raised  if a
Republican Senate in 1994 were confronted by a nominee from a Republican President. Here some of the
arguments we offer would remain relevant, but others  would cease  to be compelling.
58.  Republican  Presidents  filled vacancies  created  by  10  Justices who left the  Court, and elevated
William  Rehnquist from Associate Justice  to Chief Justice. Because of the Chief Justice's  influence and
the controversy  surrounding the Rehnquist elevation, we count this as eleven appointments.
59.  The principal exception to this is the period before the Civil War. See infra Appendix.
60.  Of the 13 Presidents who served in office from  1868, when Ulysses  S.  Grant succeeded Andrew
Johnson,  until  1932,  when  Franklin  Roosevelt  defeated  Herbert  Hoover,  11  were  Republicans.  The
exceptions  were Grover Cleveland,  elected in 1884 and 1892, and Woodrow  Wilson, elected in 1914 and
1918. See infra Appendix.
61.  Between  1932  and 1968, Democrats  won seven of nine Presidential elections;  the only exception
was a war hero, President Eisenhower. See infra Appendix.
62.  From Abraham  Lincoln until Grover Cleveland, Republicans  appointed  14 consecutive Justices.
(During part of this  period,  the Court had  10 Justices.)  Presidents  Franklin D.  Roosevelt and  Harry S.
Truman made 13 consecutive appointments. (They filled 12 vacancies and elevated Harlan Fiske Stone from
Associate Justice to ChiefJustice.) President George Washington, of course, appointed the entire membership
of the Court, then six Justices. He and President John Quincy Adams, both members of the Federalist Party,
made a total of 13 consecutive  appointments. At no other time have Presidents from one party  appointed
more than nine consecutive  Justices. See infra Appendix.
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only President in history to serve a full term without making a single appoint-
ment.63 More important, however, most of these appointments  have been made
while the Democrats thoroughly controlled Congress. In the past, one party has
tended to dominate national politics entirely, controlling both elected branches.
The last quarter-century of divided government is genuinely unique in our histo-
ry.
64
To  be  sure,  the  Supreme  Court  is  supposed  to  be  independent  of the
political  controversies  of the moment.  Its  independence  is  reflected  in  the
constitutional  provisions  for life  tenure  and  nondiminution  of salary.65  The
Court should not track popular opinion; its duty is to interpret the Constitution.
But the constitutional  plan insulates  the  Court only  to  a certain  extent.  The
Constitution  makes  the Court  responsive  to popular  sentiment  as well.  The
desire  for  responsiveness  is  reflected  in  a  selection  process  in  which  the
President and  the Senate play  crucial  and mutually constraining  roles.66 The
Constitution responds to the risk that a Court whose members serve for life may
grow too far out of touch with societal convictions. The Constitution ensures
that the Court will in a certain sense be attuned to the prevailing interpretive
aspirations of the public at large.67
When the people over time elect Presidents of different parties, and Presi-
dents  of each party  contribute to the Court, this  function is well served. The
Court's membership then has some connection with the political balance in the
country. When, as during the Roosevelt and Truman Administrations and during
most of the post-Civil War period, the people turn over both Congress and the
Presidency to one party, this function is again served, though in a different way.
The Court does not reflect a balance between the parties-because there is no
such balance in the country. Rather, the Court reflects the dominance  of one
side of the debate. After 1936, for example, the New Deal "won";68 the nation
Of course,  in  these instances,  the same party  controlled both  the white House and the  Senate-a
crucial  difference  from current  circumstances,  as  we explain in the  text.  President Washington  was not
formally a member of any party, but he was generally  thought to be  affiliated  with the Federalists, who
controlled the Senate during his administration. See JOHN C. MILLER, THE FEDERAUST ERA  122-24 (1960).
63.  See infra Appendix.
64.  Id.
65.  U.S.  CONST. art.  I,  §  1.
66.  See U.S.  CONST. art. I,  § 2, cl.  2; supra notes 7-9, 43-44 and accompanying  text.
67.  We  do not suggest that the Court should "follow th'  ilection returns,"  in Mr. Dooley's words.
GEOFFREY  R.  STONE  ET  AL.,  CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW 76-77  (2d ed. 1991) (Mr.  Dooley was Finley Peter
Dunne's pen name). We claim  only that there  is reason for concern when the Court is dominated by  one
branch and unchecked by another of similar electoral pedigree. In general, we put to one side the questions
of what counts as "too far out of touch,"  and of what is the proper relationship between existing political
convictions and judicial interpretations. The proposition in the text need not depend on controversial answers
to these questions.
Of course, it is true that in certain circumstances  a Court would do well to be quite out of touch, as
in a case in which both elected branches were censoring political speech. In this sense, there are substantive
constraints on the sorts of political convictions that properly influence constitutional interpretation, but those
substantive constraints  do not argue against our proposal here.
68.  See Bruce Ackerman,  Constitutional  PoliticslConstitutional  Law, 99 YALE  L.I.  453, 511  (1989)
("When the New Dealers gained a crushing victory in the Presidential and congressional elections of 1936,
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was thoroughly committed to it, and Democrats dominated both branches. The
Court, with thirteen consecutive appointees by Democratic Presidents, properly
reflected  the fact that the nation had made up its mind. 69
But in the last twenty-five years  the nation has not made up its mind. It
has elected mostly Republican Presidents, but mostly Democratic Senates. The
composition of the Supreme Court played a role in Presidential campaigns, and
it is possible that this issue helped settle the elections as well. We know of no
evidence that the composition of the Court has ever played a significant role
in  either  Presidential  or  senatorial  elections.  Of course,  it  is  theoretically
possible that people voted for Republican Presidential candidates because they
wanted a certain kind of Supreme Court; but it is also possible that the compo-
sition of the Court played a role in senatorial elections. Any relevant mandate
is therefore quite muddled.
In  any  case,  the  country  has  not reached  closure  on  the  questions  of
constitutional  method  or constitutional result that were raised in the  Warren
Court, the Burger Court, and the Rehnquist Court. On the contrary, the country
is deeply divided. In these circumstances,  if the Court is to stay in touch with
public convictions  (in the limited way that the appointment power envisions),
it should not reflect only the President's  views. It should reflect the Senate's
as well.
B.  Overt Ideological  Attacks on the Court by the President
A series  of appointments  by one  party  will not necessarily  reflect that
party's ideology. 7 "  Some  appointments  in the history of the Court have been
indisputably  nonideological  and  nonpartisan;  sometimes  Presidents  simply
sought a distinguished figure. 71 In such cases, the members of the Senate, even
in a period of divided government,  cannot complain  that their mandate from
the people is  being ignored by the President.
they claimed a mandate from the People in support of their new activist vision of American government.").
69.  Of course,  the nation may have wrongly made up its mind, and in that case the Court's approach
to the Constitution after the Democratic  appointments could be understood as a capitulation.  But until the
nation revisits this question,  there is no practical means to control this problem, if indeed it is a problem.
70.  We use the words "ideology"  and "politics" at various points in this Essay. By using such words,
we do not  intend  to take any controversial  position  about the  nature  of reasoning in constitutional  law.
Certainly we do not mean to identify constitutional law with "politics" or 'ideology"  or to claim that legal
reasoning is reducible in that way. But we do believe that it is much too simple to think that the interpretive
views  of the  Reagan  and Bush  Administrations  are  simply  "faithful  to  the  Constitution,"  whereas  the
interpretive  views  of Justices such  as Earl Warren  and Hugo Black represented "an  abandonment of the
Constitution."  We insist only that there is a spectrum of reasonable,  good faith interpretive  positions and
that under current conditions it is implausible to think that only one of these positions warrants participation
in judicial and public debate.
71.  Justice Cardozo is  a good example. See TRIBE, supra note 46, at 80-81. Justice  Stevens may be
another. We recognize,  however, that some would  dispute the claim  that there  are any  appointments  that
are truly nonpolitical. A nomination based purely on quality and character would be hard to imagine. Some
people of outstanding  ability and outstanding character also have views that are unacceptably extreme, and
they are therefore unappointable.
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The eleven consecutive Republican appointments do not, in general, fit this
description. Those appointments were made by four Presidents-Nixon, Ford,
Reagan,  and  Bush. Each of these Presidents  campaigned  on a platform  that
specifically  condemned  certain  Supreme  Court  decisions. 2  Each  of these
Presidents  (President Ford to a lesser extent than the others) vigorously criti-
cized the Court during his campaign and again during his Presidency.73
We do not argue that this is necessarily an inappropriate thing for a Presi-
dent to do. Concerns of this sort can be a fully legitimate part of the nomination
process.  Nor do we contend  that the resulting  nominees  have been undistin-
guished.  But when a President has  criticized  the  Court so  strongly  on such
grounds,  the President's  appointments  can be counted  on to reflect his  own
commitments. When the people elect a Senate with different convictions  from
those of the President, there is no reason  for the appointments  to reflect the
President's views alone. Under the constitutional plan, the Senate need not sit
idly by while a consistent stream of Presidential appointments  leads the Court
in a direction  of which it disapproves.
C.  Screening of  Nominees by the Administration,  With a View Toward  Likely
Voting Patterns and Judicial  Commitments
If the President, regardless of his statements during a campaign, deliberately
sought to make nonpartisan  appointments,  the Senate would have much less
warrant  for injecting  concerns  about likely  voting  patterns.  But  with  two
arguable exceptions-Justices  Stevens and Powel1 74-there  can be little doubt
that recent Republican Presidents have made appointments  on the basis of their
criticisms of the Court, attempting  to fill  vacancies with people with certain
predictable commitments.  We do  not suggest that  there has  necessarily been
a "litmus test" on such issues as  abortion or affirmative  action.  But it seems
72.  There  were "planks" involving Roe  v. Wade,  410 U.S.  113  (1973),  and Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966). See 2 NATIONAL PARTY  PLATFORMS 868, 972, 976 (Donald B.  Johnson ed., 1978)  (1972
and  1976 platforms); NATIONAL  PARTY PLATFORMS  OF 1930,  at 183,  189 (Donald B. Johnson ed.,  1982);
OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-FOURTH  REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION 343
(1988).
73.  See 1970 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: RICHARD NIXON 937; 1969
id. at 818;  1983  PUBLIC  PAPERS  OF THE  PRESIDENTS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES:  RONALD  REAGAN  876;
Bernard Weinraub, Bush Seeking Way  to Circumvent Court's  Decision on Flag  Burning, N.Y. TIMES,  June
27, 1989, at Al. Criticism of the Court by the President is not a Republican monopoly. President Roosevelt
was at least as strongly critical:
[We]  have,  therefore,  reached  the point as  a Nation  where we  must take action to  save  the
Constitution from the Court and the Court from itself  ...  We want a Supreme Court which will
do justice under the Constitution-not over it..  . . This plan will save our National Constitution
from hardening of the judicial arteries.
Franklin  Delano  Roosevelt (radio broadcast,  Mar. 9,  1937), in GERALD  GUNTHER,  CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
123  (12th  ed.  1991).
74.  Both of these men were known for a high degree of professionalism, and neither was thought to
be easily identifiable with partisan considerations. Both, however, were expected  to vote as conservatives
or moderate conservatives.
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indisputable that these Presidents  have generally attempted to choose Justices
with predictable views about the role of the Court, and whose positions on the
most  controversial  issues  facing  the  Court  were  likely  to  conform  to  the
President's own views.
President Nixon did not attempt to conceal  the real bases of his  appoint-
ments.  When he  announced  the  appointments  of Chief Justice  Burger  and
Justice Blackmun, for example, he said that  one of his  reasons for choosing
them was to change the Court's direction in criminal procedure  cases.75 Nixon
said his appointees  shared his  conservative judicial philosophy in contrast to
the "activist" philosophy of the Warren Court, obviously referring to their basic
judicial orientation, especially in such areas as race discrimination and criminal
procedure.
76
In the Reagan and Bush Administrations, the screening of  Justices has been
institutionalized. (The same is true of federal lower court judges, an important
point we consider below.) Officials in the Department of Justice and the White
House have played a prominent role in selecting  Justices."7 The public state-
ments of Presidents  Reagan and Bush have also generally confirmed  that the
nominees were chosen because of their conceptions of the appropriate judicial
role.
78
D.  The Effective Exclusion of  the Senate  from the Selection of  Lower Federal
Court Judges
During the last few years, the Senate has been effectively excluded from
the selection of lower federal court judges. This aspect of the current situation
is not widely  noted,  but it adds  to  the  case for Senate  independence  in the
selection of Supreme Court Justices. In the last twenty-five years, there have
been two very significant changes in the composition of the courts of appeals.
First, the size of those courts has expanded enormously. Second,  the Adminis-
75.  See, e.g., 1969 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS  OF  THE  UNITED STATES: RICHARD  NIXON 396.
76.  See, e.g.,  1969 id. at 396; 1971  id.  at 1055.
77.  See  generally HERMAN  ScHwARTz,  PACKING  THE  COURTS:  THE  CONSERVATIVE  CAMPAIGN  TO
REWRITE THE CONSTITUTION 58-149  (1988); see also Sheldon Goldman, The Bush Imprint  on the Judiciary,
74 JUDICATURE 294 (1991) (describing selection process under Bush); Sheldon Goldman, Reagan's  Judicial
Legacy: Completing the Puzzle and Summing Up, 72 JUDICATURE 318 (1989)  (describing selection process
under Reagan). For example, the Reagan Administration created the Committee on Federal Judicial Selection,
and White House Counsel C. Boyden Gray  currently chairs it. Id.
78.  See, e.g., Linda R. Campbell, Health May Be Fading,  But Marshall's  Wit Still Sharp, CHL TRIB.,
June 29, 1991  at 1 (President Bush says that he would replace Justice Marshall with "somebody  that would
be seen as keeping with the judicial philosophy that I've always expounded..  . interpretation, not legisla-
tion"'); David Hoffman, Reagan  Relied on His  Instincts,  WASH. POST, June  18, 1986, at Al (Administration
officials say that President Reagan's primary goal in selection of Rehnquist as ChiefJustice was Rehnquist's
agreement with President's philosophy of judicial restraint); Steven R. Weisman, Reagan  Aides Say 'Short
List' of Candidates  for Court  Is  Ready, N.Y.  TIMES,  July 1, 1981, at A19 (White House officials make clear
that President Reagan wants a nominee "to be compatible with his overall philosophy of judicial restraint").
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tration  now  systematically  screens  lower  federal  court  judges  on  several
grounds,  including the way they are likely to vote.
In  1968,  there were  83  court of appeals judges.
79  As late  as  1978,  there
were  95  court  of appeals  judges. °  Now there  are  154.81  The  turnover rate
is, correspondingly, much greater today. As a result, it is essentially impossible
for the Senate effectively to monitor the composition  of the federal courts  of
appeals.
The executive branch, using a variety of formal and informal networks, can
track potential judicial nominees for years,  observing their development  and
assessing their orientation on issues likely to come before the courts. When a
vacancy occurs, the Administration can move quickly to nominate a person who
is already relatively well known to it. The Senate will not have nearly the same
degree of familiarity with the nominee. Moreover, while the executive branch
has as much time as it needs to study a person before appointing her, the Senate
has  little  time  to  act:  once  the  President  has  nominated  someone  to  fll a
vacancy,  the  Senate  cannot  delay  its  decision  for  long  without  appearing
irresponsible. Even if the Senate did mobilize its resources, study the nominee,
and decide to reject her, it would have to repeat the process all over again with
another nominee who was known to the Administration but not to the Senators.
In theory, the Senate  could establish  a duplicate  bureaucracy and investigate
each nominee to the lower courts as thoroughly as it wished. But the expense,
and the political  costs of the delay, would be prohibitive.
The result of the institutionalized  screening of lower federal  court judges
is that  the Administration  can effectively  fill  the  lower  courts  with judges
committed to its basic views,  and the Senate  is virtually powerless  to resist.
Again, we do not argue that it is always inappropriate for the President to seek
ideologically compatible nominees for the lower courts. Screening of this sort
might, on the whole, produce nominees more capable than those produced by
82tesae the patronage  system  that characterized  earlier  times.  If the Senate  shared
the President's  basic orientation,  then executive  branch  screening  might not
necessarily be a bad thing.83 But when the country is divided on certain issues,
it is  difficult  to  see  why  the  federal judiciary  should  be monolithic  on the
matters over which divisions persist.84
79.  1968 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR  OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE  OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS 90.
80.  1978 id. at 128.
81.  947 F.2d vii-xxxii (1992).
82.  Even now the President sometimes pays  considerable attention to the views of the Senator from
the  state  in which  the  appointment will  be  made. But  this holdover  from  the patronage  system  is  no
substitute for more general senatorial participation.
83.  The point raises  some  complex issues  about  the  relationship  between the  Court  and existing
convictions within the political process. See supra  notes  68-69 and  accompanying  text.
84.  See supra Part ILA.  As a matter of constitutional  text and  structure,  there is  no barrier  to  an
independent senatorial role in the nomination of lower court judges; there is no difference for these purposes
between  the  Supreme  Court and  the lower  courts.  The  Senate is perfectly  entitled  to look carefully  at
nominees  to the lower courts  as well. We  do not, however, argue for such a role  in light of the evident
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Because the Senate is essentially unable to affect the composition of the
lower courts, Supreme Court appointments are even more important today than
in the past. They are the  Senate's only realistic opportunity to  influence the
orientation of the federal judiciary. Unlike an appointment to a court of appeals,
a Supreme Court appointment is so infrequent and so important that the Senate
can afford to invest the resources needed to investigate nominees thoroughly.
If the  Senate  is not willing to  take  an independent  look at  Supreme  Court
nominees, however, then a committed executive is free to dominate the entire
federal judiciary.
E.  The Increased  Importance of Separation  of Powers Issues
As  one would expect, the era of divided government has given rise to an
unusually large number of disputes between the branches. Often the Court must
resolve disputes  involving the allocation of power between the President and
the Congress. The constitutionality of the independent counsel provision of the
Ethics  in  Government  Act  of  1978,85  the  Gramm-Rudman-Hollings  Act,86
and the  Sentencing Commissions7 are recent illustrations. In the future, there
is likely to be litigation over the constitutionality of institutional arrangements
designed to limit Presidential  control of the administrative process.88
The problem, however,  goes  much  deeper. Recurring  and  now sharply
debated issues of statutory construction have raised important conflicts between
the executive branch and the Congress. Such issues include, most notably, the
role of legislative history in statutory interpretation 9 and the degree of defer-
ence to be given to administrative interpretations of statutes.  In the resolution
of such conflicts lies much of the de facto power of the executive branch and
the  legislature.  For  example,  there  would  be  a large  increase  in  executive
power, in some  ways at the expense  of the Congress,  if the Supreme Court
were to hold that legislative history is irrelevant and that administrative inter-
pretations prevail in the face of any slight ambiguity in the statutory text.
burdens of time and resources  that such  a role would entail.
85.  Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1820 (codified as amended  at 28 U.S.C. §§ 49, 591 (1988)); Morrison
v. Olson, 487  U.S.  654 (1988)  (upholding independent counsel provision).
86.  Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat.  1038
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C.  § 901  (1988 & Supp. 111990)); Bowsher v. Synar, 478  U.S. 714 (1986)
(invalidating Comptroller General provision of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings  Act).
87.  See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, ch. 2,98 Stat. 1987 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§§  3551-3673)  (1988);  28  U.S.C.  §§  991-998  (1988));  Mistretta v. United  States, 488  U.S.  361  (1989)
(upholding creation of Sentencing  Commission).
88.  See,  e.g., S.  1942,  102d  Congress, 1st Sess. (1991)  (imposing various constraints  on process  of
Presidential review  of regulations).
89.  See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S.  504, 527-30  (1989)  (Scalia, J.,  concurring
in judgment); United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S.  353, 371-77  (1989)  (Scalia, L, concurring  in judgment).
90.  See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources  Defense Council,  467 U.S.  837 (1984).
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The Court will undoubtedly  confront  all of these  questions  in the next
decade.  The  Civil Rights  Act of  1991,91  for example,  may raise  important
questions  about  the  role  of legislative  history  in  statutory  interpretation.92
There  may be a new  array  of arrangements  in which  Congress  attempts to
participate  in the  implementation  of federal  law  or  to  limit the President's
power to control implementation. The degree of deference owed to administra-
tive interpretations remains sharply disputed. These cases will raise difficult and
fundamental  questions about governmental structure.
Traditionally the Court has functioned as a mediator between the branches.
But it cannot perform  that function  well if one branch sees  the appointment
process as an opportunity to put sympathetic Justices on the Court, while the
other branch simply defers to the nomination of anyone whose views  are not
demonstrably  extreme.
F.  The Danger of Intellectual  Homogeneity on the Court
Other things being equal, the Court benefits when it  is composed of  Justices
with a range of views. The qualifier is important: we do not mean to suggest
that the Court should have  a member who  believes  that Brown v. Board of
Education 93 should be  overruled,  or who considers  welfare laws  unconstitu-
tional. 4  But with respect  to  a significant  number  of issues,  the  Court  can
perform its task better if there is a diversity of opinions.
This point is especially important today because Justice Marshall's retire-
ment has deprived the Court of a distinctive voice, perhaps its last liberal voice.
Of course, categories like "liberal" are contestable. But it is clear that no one
now  on  the  Court fully  shares  Justice  Marshall's  orientation.95 For  several
reasons,  even those who  disagree  with Justice Marshall  should consider  his
retirement an unfortunate development-just as the loss of the last distinctively
conservative voice would be an unfortunate development. These reasons  also
suggest why it is fundamentally incorrect to say that when the Court is predom-
inantly of one view, it does not matter whether the ninth Justice holds another
view.
First, because the Supreme Court's jurisdiction is discretionary, the Justices'
ability to identify problems in the legal system is in some ways  as important
as their ability to decide fully briefed cases. Judges with distinctive views notice
91.  Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166,  105 Stat.  1071.
92.  See Paul Gewirtz, Discrimination  Endgame, NEw REPUBLIC,  Aug.  12,  1991, at 18; Paul Gewirtz,
Fine Print,  NEW REPUBLIC,  Nov. 18,  1991, at 10.
93.  347 U.S. 483  (1954).
94.  This is so for a combination of reasons: neither of these positions is intellectually  respectable, in
the  sense that plausible  arguments cannot be brought forward on its behalf;  and each position lacks  any
significant support within the professional  community.
95.  Justice  Blackmun, the most liberal of the Court's Justices,  is generally conservative on issues of
criminal procedure. Justice Stevens is difficult to characterize as liberal or conservative.  Nor do we deny
that all of the Justices  at some points depart from what might be predicted.
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legal problems that other judges do not see-not through ignorance or malice,
but because of differing priorities. Once an issue is brought to general attention,
everyone might agree on what the outcome should be. But the issue might not
have come to the Court's attention at all were it not for the distinctive concerns
of one of the Justices. The certiorari process has often benefitted from intellec-
tual diversity of this kind, and it is important that it continue  to do so.
Second, the Court's internal deliberations will suffer if the Court does not
consist of Justices with differing views. If they are willing to listen, judges of
one general outlook will learn a great deal from those with other basic orienta-
tions.  Notably,  one of the most  significant theoretical  contributions  of the
founding period consisted of the insistence, by the Federalists against the Anti-
Federalists,  that heterogeneity  could be a  creative  and productive  force.  As
Alexander Hamilton wrote in The Federalist,  "the jarring of parties...  often
promote[s]  deliberation."96  One need  not romanticize  the real-world  conse-
quences of internal deliberation in order to suggest that differences in perspec-
tive often improve both the collective reasoning process  and the  outcomes.
Litigants alone cannot provide the necessary  perspective.  The quality  of
advocacy before the Court is uneven, and even the best advocate usually plays
only a limited role in comparison with a member of the Court. Divergent views
should be presented, and pressed, during internal deliberations, when the Court
is formulating results and reasons. In this regard, litigants are inevitably inade-
quate.
Finally,  throughout  American  history,  dissenting  opinions  have  helped
Congress  and  the President-and  even  future  generations-formulate  their
responses to the CourtY A Court that lacks a liberal voice-or a conservative
one-would  not carry  out these  educative  tasks  as  well.  It is  hard  for  the
American  public to think  about what the  Court is doing if cases include no
opinions  presenting different sides.
There remains  the question  of what counts  as diversity, and  of when a
"diverse"  view is so extreme  as to be unacceptable.  These questions  are hard
to answer in the abstract. On the one hand, the current Court is by no means
monolithic in the sense that all of its members agree on everything important.
In  any nine-member body, there will be genuine  disagreements.  And,  as  we
said, we do not think that the Court is insufficiently diverse because it lacks
anyone  who  believes,  for  example,  that Brown v.  Board of Education 98  is
wrong, or that the Constitution requires revolutionary  socialism. On the other
hand, the current Court now lacks any member fundamentally committed to the
96.  See THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 427 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
97.  See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.  113,  171 (1973)  (Rehnquist, I., dissenting); Gitlow v. New York,
268  U.S.  652, 672 (1925)  (Holmes & Brandeis,  JJ.,  dissenting); Abrams  v. United States, 250  U.S.  616,
624 (1919)  (Holmes, J., dissenting); Lochner v. New York,  198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905)  (Holmes, L,  dissenting);
Plessy v. Ferguson,  163  U.S.  537,  552 (1896) (Harlan,  I.,  dissenting); The Civil Rights Cases,  109 U.S.
3, 26 (1883)  (Harlan,  J., dissenting).
98.  347 U.S. 483  (1954).
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views on constitutional method and constitutional results represented by judges
like Hugo Black, William Brennan, William Douglas, Thurgood Marshall,  and
Earl Warren. These views  cannot be  characterized  as  marginal  or as  having
nothing valuable to offer on their behalf. They have substantial support in the
state and federal judiciaries, and from the public, Congress, professionals,  and
academics. Views of this  sort provide a valuable perspective  to the Court.
For present purposes, however, we  do not have to  define the boundaries
of the acceptable diversity of views. The need for a diversity of views  on the
Court strongly argues  in support of the position we advance: namely, that the
Senate should take an independent role in  Supreme  Court nominations.  In a
period of divided government,  Senate independence  will naturally produce  a
diversity of views on the Court. When the nation has made up its mind about
an issue-as the nation did about the New Deal in the late 1940's and as it has
today about Brown-individuals who  are at odds with the national consensus
will find  no support in either the Senate  or the Administration.99 Where  the
nation has not made up its mind-as ours has not, for example, about affirma-
tive action, abortion, sexually explicit speech, or the separation of church and
state-an independent Senate role will ensure that the Court is not monolithic,
and  that its deliberations  have  the  quality  that will be  absent if there  is no
serious encounter with divergent views.
All of these considerations suggest that, under current circumstances,  the
Senate  should undertake  an independent  role in evaluating  nominees  to  the
Supreme  Court.' 30  The Senate  is  entitled to  insist that the  next nominee be
a "liberal" or a "moderate."  It should not perceive itself as constrained by the
Presidential election to confirm all minimally competent nominees who are not
"out of the mainstream."  In the words of the Constitution, the Senate is entitled
to claim that it will not confirm any President's nominee unless there has been
a process  involving "advice"  as  well as "consent."
HI.  A POLrnCIZED  PROCESS?
We  suspect that  the  principal  source  of concern  about  an  independent
Senate role is not that it would be inconsistent with the Constitution. Rather,
the concern-and  it is  obviously an  important one-is  that  an independent
Senate  role  would unduly  politicize  the  process  of choosing Justices,  thus
99.  Sometimes,  of course, ajudge whose convictions  diverge from the national consensus might well
be  desirable  if the  judge's  own  convictions  are  based on  good reasons.  Part  of the  point  of judicial
independence is to allow  this phenomenon  to occur. But it seems hard to design an appointments process
that would systematically produce such judges.
100.  The Senate is a diverse  body. Its members do not have a single view about the appropriate role
of the Supreme  Court. The same is true of any party that controls the Senate. For example, there are sharp
disagreements among current Democrats about the appropriate role of  the Court on such issues as affirmative
action, abortion, and sex discrimination.  But these disagreements do not argue against an independent role
for the  Senate. They suggest only that each Senator should feel free to examine  and to vote  on the basis
of his or her convictions.
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exacerbating  the serious difficulties of the current situation. In fact, however,
there is good reason to think that the approach we suggest would result in a
less  politicized  appointment  process,  and  one  less  likely  to  have  the  other
undesirable characteristics that have led to so much dissatisfaction. In addition,
as we  will discuss,  there are  ways  to  help  limit any  adverse  effects  of an
independent Senate role.
A.  The Process Is Already Politicized
As we have shown, many Presidents, including most of those who appoint-
ed the last eleven Justices, more or less overtly considered a candidate's likely
voting patterns in choosing a nominee. Under the current understanding,  the
process is political  in this sense, but only at one end: the President is free to
choose as conservative  a nominee as  he thinks  he can get away with, but in
order to reject the nominee the Senate must do more than merely object to the
nominee's political or legal orientation. In order to reject a nominee, the Senate
has to find some major deficiency in character or has to brand the nominee as
"out of the mainstream."
There is  no question that, if the Senate were to  assume the independent
approach we suggest, Senators would have to be prepared to make judgments
about how nominees would  be likely to vote if they became Justices. In this
sense, our approach might add elements to the process that can be characterized
as "political."  But part of what has politicized the process is the approach  of
recent  Presidents.1"'  Requiring  the  Senate  to  be  nonpolitical  will  not cure
that.
1o2
A nonpolitical appointment process (leaving aside the question of what that
might mean 03) might be far better  than one in which both the President and
the Senate unabashedly focus  on a nominee's  likely votes. But a nonpolitical
process will not come about simply because  the Senate  abstains.  And while
there is much to be said for a process that is not politicized,  there is little to
be said for a process in which one side to a partisan debate is free to consider
likely voting patterns, while the other is supposed to remain indifferent to them.
This is especially the case in a prolonged period of divided government, when
Presidents  have  criticized  the  Court on political grounds  and  have  self-con-
sciously tried to shift its course.
101.  Another part is  the role of the Supreme Court in American  government, but an analysis of that
role would require a longer discussion  than we can provide here.
102.  Our approach would indeed politicize the process  in the sense that unlike a posture of deference,
it would produce a kind of open and sustained public debate over nominees-often prolonged, sometimes
misleading and confusing, and in many respects "political." But this is a proper, if not always well designed,
aspect of the  system of checks and balances,  and indeed of democracy itself.
103.  See supra note 71.
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B.  How an Independent Senate Role Might Ameliorate the Current  Problems
of the Appointment Process
More important, there is reason to think that our approach would actually
make the process less political.  We do not want to overstate this point, which
is somewhat speculative. But ironically, a system in which only one side is free
to be political might inject more politics into the appointment process  than a
system in which the two sides battle on equal terms.
If the Senate insists on its "advice"  function, there will be a greater likeli-
hood of bipartisan agreement before the nomination is made. A Senate willing
to provide "advice"  should allow its leadership  to meet with the President and
other  executive  branch  officials  before  a  nomination  is  made.  Influential
Senators might well provide a list of preferred or acceptable candidates.  They
should  certainly  have  an  opportunity  to  review  and  comment  on possible
Presidential  choices,  with  a power  to "veto"  before  the  fact those  potential
nominees  of whom they most strongly disapprove.  Such a system might well
move toward a genuinely deliberative process in which Senators and executive
branch officials talk together about future nominees. Such consultations might
reduce or even eliminate many of the current problems.
Moreover, if the Senate is free to consider a nominee's views openly, the
President will  have  a greater  incentive to  compromise  on the  choice of the
nominee. The Senate will also have more reason to confirm such a compromise
nominee without searching  for out-of-context  statements,  trying to  catch the
nominee in a  damaging  admission,  and  the like. As matters  stand now, the
President has a strong incentive to choose a nominee who is very conservative,
but who will be difficult to defeat.  So long as the Senate is  not openly  con-
cerned  with the nominee's  views  in the  same way  as  the President  is,  but
confines itself to the nominee's "acceptabiity"--that is, to whether the nominee
has good character and is not an extremist-the President has limited incentives
to compromise on the choice. Instead, the ideal nominee is one who strongly
agrees with the President, but who cannot be portrayed as  unacceptable.
By the same token, so long as the Senate is not unabashedly free to consid-
er likely voting patterns, it will have to find other ways  to try to defeat nomi-
nees it actually  opposes on these grounds. This is the dynamic that generates
many of the practices  that critics of the  Senate deplore.  We do  not want to
suggest that it is inappropriate for the Senate to take a careful look at a nomi-
nee's character  and integrity. Matters of character  can and should disqualify
even a nominee of great legal distinction. But the confirmation process unques-
tionably has  a tendency  to exaggerate  the importance of isolated  statements
from, for example, judicial opinions or academic  articles written years earlier
by the  nominee.  To some  extent that exaggeration  comes  about because the
Senate  is,  in  effect,  sublimating  its legitimate  concern  with  the  nominee's
judicial convictions.
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If the Senate were free to oppose a nominee explicitly because it disagreed
with  those  convictions,1 ' 4 the President would  have  a stronger  incentive  to
compromise by selecting a nominee whose views  were more in keeping with
those of the  Senate. In the current  climate, under the approach we advocate,
it is not at all implausible that the President and the Senate might agree on a
moderate nominee of genuine distinction. The President, knowing that he could
not rely on the confirmation  of an extreme  conservative,  might find such a
nominee the second-best choice. The Senators, knowing they had done all they
could to obtain a more moderate nominee, would have less incentive to attack
the nominee's record in ways that might be unfair. Both sides, having check-
mated each other on this dimension, might be more concerned with the nomi-
nee's qualities  of intellect and vision.
In the long run, this interaction might be exceedingly healthy. Assume, for
example, that the next nominee were a genuinely distinguished moderate, with
unpredictable  views on  currently  controversial  issues.  Assume also  that the
selection of such a nominee emerged through  a process in which the Senate
offered its advice and threatened to refuse its consent. If a Republican President
nominated some such person, the dynamics of political compromise ought to
leave him freer to fill the next seat with a genuinely distinguished conservative.
Over the course of time, a President who, facing an independent Senate, was
prepared to compromise on likely voting patterns for genuine distinction, might
well, and certainly should, find a Senate prepared to do the same. Both distinc-
tion and diversity-in the  sense of maintaining a Court that reflected,  in an
appropriate  way, the heterogeneity  of public opinion-might be furthered in
this way.
It is naive to suppose that this would be the inevitable result of the indepen-
dent Senate role we describe. But there is reason to believe that these desirable
outcomes  are more likely if the Senate  takes an independent approach.  The
Supreme  Court  appointment  process  is  already  politicized;  the institutions
established by the executive branch for screening prospective  nominees  attest
to  how  deep-seated  that politicization  is.  Allowing  the  Senate  to  meet  the
Administration  openly on grounds of a nominee's likely voting patterns  holds
out some hope of reducing the politicization.  And even if it does not do that,
it will nonetheless break the unjustified monopoly that the Administration now
has  on the  consideration of political  orientation in nominees. Above  all,  an
active Senate  role might increase the likelihood  of a distinguished  Supreme
104.  The point raises an important and controversial question: Should Senators be allowed to question
the nominee about votes in specific cases? In brief, we advocate the following approach. Members  of the
Senate  are  fully entitled  to  ask such  specific questions  as  they like.  Nominees  are entitled to refuse  to
answer-if they do  refuse, they  may do so in part  on the plausible  ground that no assurances  should be
given in advance, lest judicial independence  be compromised. But for its part, the Senate is entitled to take
into account the refusal to answer-subject to the important qualifications we discuss below. See infra Part
IC.  Senators may conclude that the  absence of relevant assurances  counts  against confirmation.
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Court,  one whose members offer the appropriate qualities of character, excel-
lence, and diversity of view.
C.  The Problem of "Campaigning"  for the Court
No one would welcome an appointments process in which nominees to the
Court made  campaign promises--commitments  about how they will vote on
particular issues-to various  Senators in the hope of gaining  enough votes to
be confirmed. Of course, once a nominee is confirmed, any such commitment
is unenforceable. But a nominee who promised during a Senate hearing that
she would not, for example, vote to overrule Roe v. Wade 05 would inevitably
think twice about the public uproar that would result if she were persuaded by
contrary arguments  as  a Justice  and reneged on that promise.
At first  glance  our  proposal  seems likely  to  encourage  such  campaign
promises.  On balance, however, it is unlikely that Senate independence  would
make this problem worse than it already is. In fact, it might improve matters.
Whenever politics becomes strongly ideological,  people who want to be
on the Supreme Court have an incentive to campaign for the Court by reshaping
their views. When a President pursues  an ideological  appointments  strategy,
the incentive is even greater. It is a safe prediction, for example, that the Bush
Administration will not appoint anyone who has taken an unequivocal position
in support of Roe.1 06 Neither the President nor his advisers would have to ask
a prospective nominee overt questions about such issues as abortion, affirmative
action, or capital punishment.  Since the  President has  the whole country  to
choose from, he can select someone who is reliable on these issues. People who
want to be on the Court know that.
If the Senate were to begin to act in the independent way we describe, what
would change is not the degree of this kind of campaigning, but only the target.
One could expect some people  who see themselves  as potential nominees  to
begin  tailoring their public views  to  conform more  closely  to  those of key
Senators, instead of trying to attract the attention of the Administration as they
do now. This would not be a desirable state of affairs, but it is no worse than
what we have now. Moreover, campaigning of this kind, which often consists
of writing  editorials  and  making  speeches,  is  not  nearly as  troublesome  as
explicit commitments made to  a Senator in public  hearings.
Perhaps  surprisingly, our proposal should have the effect of reducing the
likelihood  of that kind of public commitment.  Senators are aware  of the un-
seemliness of a Supreme Court nominee having to campaign for office. Senators
on the Judiciary Committee, for example, often try to learn about the nominee's
105.  410 U.S.  113  (1973).
106.  The point is not partisan:  the Roosevelt Administration would not have  appointed  anyone who
stated that the New Deal was unconstitutional,  and a Democratic President in the  near future is unlikely
to appoint  anyone who unequivocally  opposes Roe.
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views while taking pains not to ask for commitments on specific issues. More-
over, Senators  realize that public questioning of a well-coached  nominee, by
Senators  who  must be careful  not to  look too partisan  or too bullying, is  a
particularly ineffective  way to find out what a nominee really thinks.
What forces the Senators to ask uncomfortably  specific questions is their
sense that they would otherwise be excluded from any effective role in shaping
the Court's  orientation. If the  Senate asserted itself more fully-if it were a
partner in choosing the nominee, instead of an after-the-fact check on accept-
ability-it would not need to rely so heavily on the crude and ineffective  tool
of public questioning. As matters now stand, the President has an incentive to
choose the most conservative nominee he can find and then devise the best way
to slide that nominee through the Senate. The nominee then says what she must
in the confirmation hearings. If the Senate were a full partner in the appoint-
ments process, the President would have a greater incentive to obtain the assent
of key Senators  before  announcing  a nominee.  Those Senators,  in deciding
whether  to  assent, could examine  the  candidate's  entire record-just  as  the
President can. Like the President,  they would not need to seek explicit commit-
ments on specific issues at the time of the nomination. Indeed, they would be
foolish to rely on such a "campaign promise" unless the nominee's entire record
made it credible.
The current system creates a substantial incentive to make public commit-
ments; unless a nominee can satisfy the Senate that she is acceptable, the Senate
will reject the  nomination even now. Thus, nominees routinely  genuflect to
Brown and, now, Griswold. There is good reason  to believe that the changes
in the Senate's approach that we propose will not make matters any worse, and
may even make them better.
D.  Improving the Process
As  our previous  arguments  suggest,  an independent  Senate role might,
perhaps paradoxically, diminish the importance of the confirmation hearings.
Currently, the confirmation hearing is a climactic media  spectacle that deter-
mines whether the President can slip his nominee (whom everyone knows was
chosen in part for her likely voting patterns, despite the President's claims that
merit was the exclusive basis) past the Senate  (which is also concerned  with
the nominee's likely votes, notwithstanding the Senators'  contention that they
are concerned only with character, competence,  and whether the nominee is in
the "mainstream").  The fate of legislation is not decided in this manner. For
the reasons outlined above, judicial appointments would not be decided in this
way either, if the Senate approached them with the same independence it brings
to the President's legislative initiatives.
In any event, many of the problems of the current appointments process,
particularly  those pointed  out by supporters of the Administration,  arise from
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the central role of the confirmation hearing. Whether or not the Senate adopts
a more  independent  view  of its role  (and  perhaps  especially  if it  does),  a
number of steps might be taken to reduce the significance of the hearing and
to improve the process in general.
(1) The President should seek and take seriously the "advice"  offered by
the Senate. We have suggested several ways in which this might be done: the
President might solicit a list of the Senate's preferred candidates; key Senators
might be invited to review and comment  on possible choices;  or there might
be ongoing discussions between Senators and the White House about possible
nominees. If such consultations produced a mutually agreeable candidate, the
hearings would be  simpler and much less contentious.  Even if the President
could not agree with key Senators on a nominee, serious consultation  would
reduce the range of disagreement and,  therefore, the adversarial nature of the
hearings. The hearings would cease to be the only forum in which the Senate
could make its voice heard.
(2) More generally, it is in the Senate's  own interest to place less weight
on the confirmation hearings.  Both sides have pointed to serious problems in
the  current  emphasis  on  those  hearings.'07  Of particular  importance  is  the
threat to judicial independence  posed by ongoing  conversations  between  the
Department of Justice and the White House on the one hand, and the nominee
on the other. These conversations frequently involve matters likely to reach the
Court. It is unfortunate if the nominee has been schooled in the views of the
current Administration.  Moreover,  the hearings sometimes  become  mired in
irrelevant or misleading factors,  such as the nominee's telegenic qualities  and
how the various Senators "look." Televised competition between Senators and
the nominee, or among the Senators, is hardly in the national interest. Finally,
because of their immediacy and drama, the hearings tend to assume dispropor-
tionate  importance.  They  can  dwarf the  much  more  relevant  information
provided by the pre-nomination record. The pre-nomination record is a far more
reliable indicator of the nominee's  views. The Senate should rely principally
on  that record,  rather  than  a nominee's  testimony,  in  deciding  whether  to
consent  to  the  nomination.  Such  an  emphasis  would  reduce  many  of the
problems of the current system.
This is not to say that hearings  do not have some virtues. At least in their
ideal form, they have an important educative function. Confirmation hearings
might help inform the public of the actual and potential role of the Supreme
Court, allowing  diverse views to be expressed on that subject. Too often the
107.  See supra notes  1-4  and  accompanying  text. We  note in particular  the  distortions of the pre-
nomination record  of Judge Robert Bork, catalogued  in ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPT1NG  OF AMIERICA:
THE POLMCAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 323-36 (1988); the extensive preparation of nominees David Souter
and Clarence Thomas before their hearings;  the reliance on general appearance  before the camera in the
Bork, Souter, and Thomas hearings;  the effects of television coverage on some Senators' behavior, and the
uninformative generalities  provided  by several recent nominees in their statements  to the Senators.
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nature  of  the  Court,  and  of constitutional  law  generally,  is  unnecessarily
obscured;  hearings can serve  to enlighten. But the current system offers only
minor advances in public education, and it does so while introducing a range
of distortions into the process.  Moreover, it appears  that the hearings can be
truly educative only on those occasions when the system is, in a sense, out of
equilibrium.  This  occurs,  for example,  when  the  questioners  unexpectedly
change their tactics and the Administration and nominee are caught unprepared.
Once the executive adjusts, the hearings become stylized and their educative
value is reduced. Reducing the centrality  of the hearings would  significantly
advance  the goal of a healthy  confirmation process.'0 8
(3) The Senate should place the burden of proof-with respect to character,
excellence,  and point of view--on the nominee. No one has  a right to sit on
the Supreme Court. The country need not accept nominees simply because they
might ultimately prove distinguished  or open-minded. A "hope" to this effect
is  insufficient." 0 9  In  exercising  its  consent  power, the  Senate is  entitled  to
reject nominees  simply because they have not established  that they have the
requisite qualities,  even if there is considerable uncertainty  on that point.
This  understanding  of the  burden of proof would remove  some of the
difficulties  introduced by greater reliance  on the pre-nomination record.  For
example, such reliance creates an incentive for the President to nominate people
without extensive records, simply because they have not said anything contro-
versial.110 The Senate need not confirm someone of this sort. Indeed, it should
presume that a candidate of this kind will not meet the burden of proof.
(4) The  Senate might rely  more  formally  on lawyers  familiar  with the
workings and practices of the Court. The Senators have an extraordinary range
of duties.  Although  many  Senators  are,  by training  and  temperament,  well
equipped to handle constitutional issues, it is unreasonable to expect members
of the Judiciary Committee to be specialists in the intricacies of legal doctrine.
Perhaps  some of the questioning should be done directly  by outside counsel.
Perhaps there should be sharp time limits on senatorial questioning. In any case,
the difficulties inherent in the hearing process, especially in an era dominated
108.  A reduced emphasis on the hearings might, however, also work against an independent senatorial
role, at least to the extent that such hearings mobilize public opposition to a nominee. We hope that such
a role does not depend on such mobilization, produced as it sometimes is by arbitrary or irrelevant factors.
109.  It follows that the burden of proof required in a criminal trial is inappropriate in the confirmation
hearings. A heavy burden of proof is correctly placed  on governmental  efforts to incarcerate someone,  or
to convict him of a criminal offense;  in view of the enormous  harm of a mistake-the  conviction of an
innocent person-the state must bear an extraordinary  burden. In a confirmation hearing, the possibility of
harm  argues  in precisely  the opposite  direction.  Someone wrongly  denied  a seat on the  Court may  be
embarrassed  or worse, but is hardly placed in the position of a convicted criminal. Someone wrongly placed
on the Court is in a unique position to commit social harm. For this reason we think much of the "heavy
burden of proof' rhetoric in the confirmation hearings involving Justice Thomas was misconceived-though
we do not confront the many complexities  of those hearings, unfortunate  by any standard, in this space.
110.  As argued at the time by Bork's supporters, an unfortunate consequence  of the Bork hearings has
been precisely  this.
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by television coverage, argue strongly against the current emphasis on a process
that has become a public spectacle.
These  are simply  a few suggestions  intended  to  counteract  some of the
difficulties  likely to  accompany  an  independent  role  for the  Senate.  Other
solutions are surely possible as well. The principal point is that the confirmation
hearing  ought not  to  be  the  centerpiece  of the  decision  whether  or  not to
consent to a judicial  appointment.  There are  far more reliable  and desirable
means  from which the Senate can draw information  about the candidate.
IV.  CONCLUSION
The  Constitution  contemplates  an  important role  for  the  Senate  in the
confirmation process. It provides  that there will be senatorial "advice"  before
the fact. It ensures that no nominee may  serve without senatorial "consent."
There is especially strong structural support for such a role in connection with
appointments to the branch of government that resolves disputes  and allocates
power between the other two branches.
We are in the midst of an extraordinary period--one in which Republican
Presidents have made eleven consecutive appointments, usually with ideological
motivations, even though the Congress was solidly controlled by the Democratic
Party for virtually  this  entire  period. In this  context,  it is unhealthy  for the
Senate to maintain a posture of deference. The current system, unprecedented
in the nation's  history, creates serious risks from the standpoint of checks and
balances. The Senate should now assume a self-consciously  independent role.
It should insist on its constitutional  prerogatives.
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APPENDIX
TABLE  1. Judicial Appointments by President
YEAR  PESmENrT  PRESmEnr'S  JUSCE(s)  YEAR  SENATE'S
pARry
a APoamD  CONFRIdMA  PARry
a
1789  Washington (10)
1797  1. Adams (3)
1801  Jefferson  (3)
1809  Madison (2)
1817  Monroe (1)
1825  J.Q. Adams  (1)
1829  Jackson (6)
1837  Van Buren (2)
1841  W. Harrison (0)
1841  'Tyler (1)
1845  Polk  (2)
1849  Taylor (0)
1850  Fillmore (1)
1853  Pierce (1)
F  John Jay CJ
John Rutledge
William Cushing
James Wilson
John Blair
James Iredell
Thomas Johnson
William Paterson
Samuel  Chase
Oliver Ellsworth  C
F  Bushrod Washington
Alfred Moore
John Marshall CJ
DR  William Johnson
H. Brockholst Livingston
Thomas Todd
DR  Joseph Story
Gabriel Duvall
DR  Smith Thompson
C  Robert Trimble
D  John  McLean
Henry Baldwin
James M. Wayne
Roger B. Taney CJ
Philip B. Barbour
John  Cairon
D  John McKinley
Peter V.  Daniel
W
W  Samuel Nelson
D  Levi Woodbury
Robert C. Grier
W
W  Benjamin R. Curtis
D  John A.  Campbell
1521
1811  DR
1811  DR
1823  DR
1826  Ad
1837  D
1841  D
1845  W
1845  D
1846  D
1851  D
1853  D
a Letter symbols for political parties: Ad - Administration; C - Coalition; D - Democratic; DR - Democratic-Republican;
F - Federalist; R - Republican; W - Whig.
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1857  Buchanan (1)
1861  Lincoln (5)
1865  A. Johnson (0)
1869  Grant (4)
1877  Hayes (2)
1881  Garfield (1)
1881  Arthur (2)
1885  Cleveland (2)
1889  B. Harrison (4)
1893  Cleveland  (2)
1897  McKinley  (1)
1901  T. Roosevelt  (3)
1909  Taft (6)
1913  Wilson (3)
The Yale Law Journal
D  Nathan Clifford
R  Noah H. Swayne
Samuel F. Miller
David Davis
Stephen J. Field
Salmon P. Chase CJ
R
R  William Strong
Joseph R Bradley
Ward Hunt
Morrison R. Waite C"
R  John M. Harlan
William B. Woods
R  Stanley Matthews
R  Horace Gray
Samuel Blatchford
D  Lucius Q.C. Lamar
Melville W. Fuller CJ
R  David J. Brewer
Henry  B. Brown
George Shiras, Jr.
Howell E. Jackson
D  Edward D.  White
Rufus W. Peckham
R  Joseph McKenna
R  Oliver W. Holh2s,  Jr.
Wiliam R. Day
William H. Mocdy
R  Horace H.  Larton
Charles E. Hughes
Edward D. White Cl
Willis Van Devanter
Joseph R. Laina
Mahlon Pitney
D  James C. McReynolds
Louis D. Brandeis
John H. Clarke
[Vol.  101:  1491
b  The Senate  was evenly  divided in  the 47th Congress,  with Vice-President Chester Arthur giving the Republican Party
control.
c  Denotes a Chief Justice who  was elevated from the position of Associate Justice.
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1921  Harding (4)
1923  Coolidge (1)
1929  Hoover (3)
1933  Roosevelt (9)
1945  Truman (4)
1953  Eisenhower (5)
1961  Kennedy (2)
1963  Johnson (2)
1969  Nixon (4)
1974  Ford (1)
1977  Carter (0)
1981  Reagan (4)
R  William IL Taft CJ
George Sutherland
Pierce Butier
Edward T. Sanford
R  Harlan P. Stone
R  Charles E Hughes CJ
Owen J. Roberts
Benjamin N. Cardozo
D  Hugo L. Black
Stanley F. Reed
Felix Frankfurter
William 0. Douglas
Frank Murphy
Harlan F. Stone Cle
James F. Bymes
Robert H. Jackson
Wiley B. Rutledge
D  Harold IL  Burton
Fred 1L Vinson CJ
Tom C. Clark
Sherman Minton
R  Er  Warren CJ
John M. Harlan
William J. Brennan, Jr.
Charles E. Whittaker
Potter Stewart
D  Byron R. White
Arthur J. Goldberg
D  Abe Fortas
Thurgood Mtarshal
R  Warren E. Burger CT
Harry A.  Blacinnun
Lewis F. Powell
Wiliam H. Rehnquist
R  John Paul Stevens
D
R  Sandra Day O'Connor
Willam H. Rehnquist  Ci
e
Antonin Scalia
Anthony M. Kennedy
d The Republican Party held the Senate'by a two-vote margin in the 66th Congress.
e Denotes a Chief Justice who was  elevated from the position  of Associate Justice.
The Republican Party held the Senate in the 83d Congress by only one vote, with one Senator affiliating with neither the
Democratic nor the Republican Party.
g  In the 84th Congress,  the  Democrats held the Senate  by only one vote, with one  Senator  affiliating  with neither  the
Republican nor the Democratic Party.
I  The  Democrats'  majority in the Senate  in the 85th Congress  was only two votes.
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1925  R
1962  D
1962  D
1965  D
1967  D
1975  D
HeinOnline  -- 101 Yale L.J. 1523 1991-19921524
1989  Bush (2)
The Yale Law Journal
R  David H. Souter
Clarence Thomas
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1990  D
1991  D
TABLE 2.  Appointments and Senate Majority Party
NummR  OF  SENATE  I.AsRO1IY  PARTY
JUSTICES
YEAR  PRESIDENT(S)  PARTY  APPOINTED'  D  R
1921-33  Harding/Coolidge/Hoover  R  8  0  8
1953-61  Eisenhower
1969-92  Nixon/FordReagan/Bush
1933-53  Roosevelt/Ifuman
1961-69  Kennedy/Johnson
1979-81  Carter
13  0
SOURCES:  CONGRESS  ATO Z: CQ's READY R.EBIuENCEENCYCLOFEDIA  496-98 (Congressional Quarterly Inc. 1988);
HAROLD W. STAERY  & RICHARD  E. NIEMI  VITAL  STATISTICS  ON  ARiESCAN  POLITICS  292-97 (1992);  ELDER  WRITr,  GUIDE TO
THE  U.S.  SUFRED,  COURT 995-98  (1990).
This includes three elevations from Associate Justice to Chief Justice, two in the Harding/Coolidge/Hoover era, and one
in the Nixon/Ford/Reagan/Bush  era.
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